MATERIALISTS claim that in principle mentality could be accounted for entirely by properties of matter. They must, of course, clarify, as far as possible, the precise scope of the concept "properties of matter." According to materialists there exists only one type of "substance" in the universe, namely matter. Sophisticated experimental and theoretical analyses have led contemporary physicists to interpret known material entities as being composed of two classes of elementary particles, namely quarks and leptons and constituents of interaction fields that (...) mediate interactions between some or all of the elementary particles and which comprise photons, gluons, intermediate bosons and gravitons. For instance, protons and neutrons are composed--by hypothesis--of quarks, while electrons are probably the most familiar leptons. Whether any analyzed and postulated elementary particles and constituents of interaction fields are "ultimate" components of matter can never be known. It remains always possible that more basic subcomponents of known components will be discovered. This has happened repeatedly throughout the history of physics. Hence, what physicists understand by the "physical properties" of the basic components of matter must always remain expressed in terms of usually intricate hypothetico-deductive theories which are tentative and fallible. Contemporary relativistic quantum mechanics of elementary particles and of interaction fields provide typical examples of such hypothetico-deductive theories relating to present known basic components of matter. (shrink)

SummaryExtremism in the environment‐versus innateness controversy in the behavioural sciences and in human sociobiology is being examined. Genetic effects can be severely modified or overruled by environmental factors, but may, nevertheless, be important. Dawkins' view that we are survival machines programmed to subserve selfish genes seems untenable and is a root of racialism. It is also argued that morality is compatible with mixed genetic and environmental control of brains via existing biological machinery.

Over two decades have passed since the publication of van Gelder's (1998) “dynamical hypothesis.” In that paper, van Gelder proposed that cognitive agents were not digital computers—per the representational computational approach—but dynamical systems. The evolution of the dynamical hypothesis was driven by parallel advances in three areas. Theoretically, a deeper understanding of genetics, biology, neuroscience, and cognitive science inspired questions about how systems within each domain dynamically interact and extend their effects across spatiotemporal scales. Methodologically, more sophisticated and domain-general tools (...) allowed researchers to discover, model, and quantify system dynamics, structure, and patterns across multiple scales to generate a more comprehensive system-level understanding of behaviors. Empirically, we can analyze a system's behavior while preserving its natural dynamics, revealing evidence that the reductionist approach leads to an incomplete understanding of the components and the overall system. Researchers have traditionally reduced a complex system into its component processes and assumed that the parts can be recombined to explain the whole. These three advances fundamentally altered our understanding of a “cognitive agent:” How their behaviors are driven by long-range coordination across multiple processes, how the interdependent and nested structure of interacting variables produces behaviors that are greater than the sum of its parts, and how environmental constraints shape adaptive yet stable behavioral patterns. (shrink)

We comment on the previous paper by L. Basano. In particular, we show that its Section 2 is kinematically incorrect (the dynamics of a two-body interaction through tachyon exchange, incidentally, has already been thoroughly expounded in one paper of ours). Its Section 1 is simply a rather subjective introduction. As to its Section 3, containing indeed interesting problems, we again briefly refer to our earlier work. Our conclusions are still in favor of “au revoir to tachyons!,” even if it is (...) known that inside our cosmos tachyons are more likely to have a role in physics (e.g., in elementary particle and black-hole physics) as “exchanged objects” rather than as “asymptotically free” objects. (shrink)

The theory of pramonotheism is an important part of the theological conception of religion. Its founder is an Austrian theologian of the twentieth century. W. Schmidt. However, this theory was advanced and developed even before Schmidt in the Orthodox thought of the twentieth century, in which it was called "the doctrine of the original monotheism." The theory of pramonotheism was developed in the field of basic theology with the task of comprehending the emergence and evolution of religion in the paradigm (...) of Christian monotheism, as well as to refute views of religion only in the context of the natural laws of human consciousness and social life. (shrink)